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ARE HUMANS ANIMALS?: PATENT CLAIM
CONSTRUCTION IN MARTEK BIOSCIENCES CORP. V.
NUTRINOVA, INC., 579 F.3D 1363 (FED. CIR. 2009)
Colleen Murphy*

I. INTRODUCTION
Judges are responsible for claim construction, or in other words,
interpreting the meaning of terms used to define the scope of an
invention in a patent to determine whether infringement has occurred. 1
For example, a patent may claim a pen as a “cylindrical utensil” used to
write on paper. The patent owner then alleges that a company selling
crayons has infringed his patent. The judge would have to examine the
patent documents to interpret whether the terms claimed in the patent
encompass a crayon. 2 A “cylindrical utensil” of a pen could be
interpreted as an object that easily fits into a person’s hand to leave
marks as it is dragged over a surface. Alternatively, a “cylindrical
utensil” of a pen may be interpreted as a storage container filled
specifically with ink. The first interpretation is broad and would include
a crayon in the claimed invention, while the second interpretation is a
narrow approach that would exclude a crayon.
This dichotomy over claim term interpretation was also an issue in
Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc. 3 Martek made and sold
docosahexaenoic acid (DHA) products. 4 DHA is an omega-3 fatty acid
“that plays an important role in the development of organs such as the
heart, brain, and eyes” and has additional health benefits. 5 Because it is
desirable to provide supplemental DHA, Martek obtained a patent for a
method of increasing the concentration of omega-3 highly unsaturated
fatty acids (HUFA) in animals by feeding them certain
microorganisms. 6 Martek asserted that the defendant, Lonza, infringed
* Associate Member, 2009–2010 University of Cincinnati Law Review. The author would like
to thank Professor Timothy Armstrong for his guidance as well as her family, Trevor Tersmette, Kevin
Murphy, and Betty Murphy, for their support.
1. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (Markman II), 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). The
Supreme Court held that interpreting a claim is a purely legal issue. Id.
2. See id. at 388.
3. Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
4. Id. at 1367.
5. Id.
6. Id.

1213

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

1

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 8
L-MURPHY

1214

8/3/2011 11:07:39 AM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

this patent by using the disclosed method on humans. 7 Lonza responded
that the term “animal” should be interpreted to encompass only
nonhuman animals, and therefore, the patent was not infringed. 8 After
the district court, using a narrow construction, determined that the term
“animal” did not include humans, Martek appealed. 9
Martek illustrates that the method of construing patent claim terms,
broadly or narrowly, greatly affects the decision of whether patent
infringement has occurred. Part II of this Casenote further explains
these two different approaches to claim construction established by the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Part III describes the Federal
Circuit’s application, in Martek BioSciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, of the
broad method of constructing claims by concluding that humans were
included in the term animal. Part IV discusses whether it was
appropriate for the Federal Circuit to employ the broad approach of
claim construction in a five judge panel. Finally, Part V concludes that
the broad approach was not appropriate in Martek because of the
uncertainty and diminished uniformity it causes in the patent system.
II. STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RELATED CASES
The United States Constitution gives Congress the ability to grant
patents “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”10 After
inventors obtain a patent, Congress gives them the right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the
United States for a period of twenty years from the time the patent
application was filed. 11 Anyone who commits these acts without
authority from the patent owner is deemed to infringe that patent. 12 If a
patent is infringed, “[a] patentee shall have remedy by civil action for
infringement of his patent.” 13
To determine whether a patent is infringed, the meaning of the claims
in issue must first be determined. 14 Then, the claims must be read onto
the accused products. 15 The accused product infringes the patent when
all of the elements of the claims read literally onto the product, or the

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 1367–69.
Id. at 1380.
Id. at 1368, 1379.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006).
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006).
Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 401 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
Id.
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product does substantially the same work, in substantially the same way,
and accomplishes substantially the same result. 16 The Supreme Court
established that determining the meaning of the claims in a patent is a
question of law. 17 The Federal Circuit further provided that it is an issue
for de novo review. 18 Two competing approaches for the method of
interpreting claims, a broad approach and a narrow approach, have
emerged from the judges in the Federal Circuit. 19
A. The Role of the Court During Claim Construction
In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., the Supreme Court
determined that interpreting claim terms was a purely legal issue.20
Markman owned a patent for an inventory control and reporting system
for dry-cleaning stores. 21 Markman sued Westview, claiming that
Westview was making a product that infringed his patent. 22 A key issue
in the case was what the term “inventory” meant. 23 If “inventory”
merely encompassed cash inventory, Westview would infringe;
however, if “inventory” encompassed cash inventory and physical
inventory of articles of clothing, Westview would not infringe
Markman’s patent. 24 Although the jury found that Westview infringed,
the district court judge granted Westview’s deferred motion for
judgment as a matter of law. 25 The judge determined that interpreting
the claim term was a legal issue and concluded that “inventory” was a
broad term that included cash and clothing inventory.26
Both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court’s decision. The Supreme Court agreed with the Federal Circuit
that interpreting claims was “the exclusive province of the court . . . .” 27
16. Id.
17. Markman II, 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
18. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454–55 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). The
Federal Circuit held that the de novo standard of review as stated in Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc. (Markman I), 52 F.3d 967, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, Markman II, 517 U.S. 370 (1996),
remains good law. Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1455.
19. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (applying a broad
approach for claim construction); SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242
F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (applying a narrow approach for claim construction).
20. Markman II, 517 U.S. at 372.
21. Id. at 374–75.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 375.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 376.
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The Court determined that during the period when the Seventh
Amendment was adopted to preserve the right to a jury trial, “judges, not
juries, ordinarily construed written documents.” 28 The likelihood that
judges did the same in patent litigation was confirmed by the earliest
English reports describing construction of patent documents, which
showed judges construing the terms, the Supreme Court further found. 29
Therefore, the Court established that for construction of written
instruments, judges often do and are likely to do better than a jury. 30
Patent construction in particular was considered to be “a special
occupation” that required “special skill and practice”; therefore, a
trained, disciplined judge was more likely than a jury to properly
interpret patents. 31 In conclusion, the Supreme Court determined that
claim construction was solely a role for a judge. 32
B. The Role of the Federal Circuit During Claim Construction
In Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., the Federal Circuit
concluded that because claim construction is a purely legal issue, the
court is permitted to conduct its own interpretation of the claims on
appeal. 33 In this case, the patent was exclusively licensed to FAS and
disclosed a device and method for accurately dispensing industrial
liquids. 34 Cybor Corp. sued FAS seeking declaratory judgment of noninfringement, invalidity, and unenforceablity. 35 FAS counterclaimed for
infringement of all claims and sought damages and an injunction. 36
Based on the district judge’s construction of the claims, the jury found
that Cybor Corp. had infringed FAS’s patent. 37 The Federal Circuit
determined that although the law was clear that claim construction was
the job of the judge, not jury, this case presented the issue of the proper
role of the circuit court in reviewing the district court’s claim
construction. 38 It concluded that after Markman, de novo review
remained good law and that the Federal Circuit had the authority to

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 381–82.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 388.
Id. at 388–89.
Id. at 391.
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454–55 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
Id. at 1451–53.
Id. at 1453.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1454.
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reverse legal conclusions of the district court. 39 The Federal Circuit
then performed its own claim construction analysis and affirmed the
lower court’s decision. 40 Thus, the Federal Circuit determined that it
was permitted to perform its own claim construction as a matter of law
on appeal. 41
C. Alternative Methods to Claim Construction in the Federal Circuit
In Phillips v. AWH Corp., the Federal Circuit identified the primary
issue of claim construction as how much emphasis should be placed on
the patent application itself. 42 The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112
states that “[t]he specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the same . . . .” 43 The
second paragraph states that “[t]he specification shall conclude with one
or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.” 44 The
Federal Circuit determined that those two paragraphs frame the issue of
claim construction. 45 The court found the second paragraph requires the
court to look to the language of the claims to determine what the
applicant regarded as the invention, and the first paragraph required that
the specification describe the invention set forth in the claims. 46 The
court found the principal question to be “the extent to which [it] should
resort to and rely on a patent’s specification in seeking to ascertain the
proper scope of its claims.” 47
Although the Federal Circuit has developed a hierarchy of evidence to
be used when construing patent terms, two competing theories have
emerged from the Federal Circuit regarding how much reliance should
be placed on the specification to ascertain the proper scope of the
claims. 48 A broad approach that began with a generic baseline
39. Id. at 1454–55.
40. See id. at 1456–59.
41. Id. at 1454–55.
42. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
43. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
44. Id.
45. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (applying a broad approach for claim
construction); SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (applying a narrow approach for claim construction).
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definition of the claim terms was used in Phillips v. AWH Corp., while a
narrow approach that began with a limited definition of the claim terms
taken from the patent documents was used in SciMed Life Systems, Inc.
v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. 49 The Federal Circuit then
attempted to reconcile these different approaches in Nystrom v. Trex
Co., Inc. 50
1. Hierarchy of References
When the Federal Circuit considered Markman I, it presented a
hierarchy of references for interpreting terms that began with intrinsic
evidence. 51 It found that intrinsic evidence should be heavily relied
upon and included the patent’s claims, specification, and prosecution
history. 52 First, claims included in the patent application must
“particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[]” the scope and subject
that the applicant regards as the invention. 53 The specification is a
written description of the invention, including drawings, that precedes
the claims in a patent application. 54 Second, it must be in “clear,
concise, and exact terms” that enable a person skilled in the art to make
and use the invention. 55 Third, the prosecution history is a complete
record of the proceedings before the United States Patent Office while
the patent application is being considered for issuance. 56 In Markman,
the Federal Circuit found these intrinsic references to be the three main
sources that judges should use when interpreting claim terms. 57
The Federal Circuit further determined in Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, Inc. that extrinsic evidence may also be used for
interpreting terms, but that it is not as significant as intrinsic evidence. 58
Extrinsic evidence includes evidence that is not a part of the patent or
prosecution history. 59 This includes “expert and inventor testimony,
dictionaries, and learned treatises.” 60
In Markman I, the court
established that it might be helpful to review this evidence “to explain
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See supra note 48.
See Nystrom v. Trex Co., Inc. (Nystrom II), 424 F.3d 1136, 1145–46 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Markman I, 52 F.3d 967, 978–81 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
Id. at 979.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
Id.
Id.
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Markman I, 52 F.3d at 979.
Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583.
Markman I, 52 F.3d at 980.
Id.
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scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms” and to
“demonstrate the state of the prior art at the time of the invention.” 61
Further, the court in Vitronics stated that using extrinsic evidence to
understand technology is different than using extrinsic evidence to
determine the proper construction of a disputed term. 62 Extrinsic
evidence may only be relied upon when determining the proper
construction of a disputed term if the patent documents, taken as a
whole, are insufficient to enable the court to construe disputed claim
terms. 63 In Vitronics, the court was asked to construe the meaning of
“solder reflow temperature.” 64 The court held that extrinsic evidence
was not needed to construe these terms based on the guidance provided
by the intrinsic evidence. 65 Therefore, only when intrinsic evidence
fails to enable the court to construe claim terms may extrinsic
supplements be used. 66
2. A Broad Approach to the Use of the Specification During Claim
Construction
In Phillips v. AWH Corp., the Federal Circuit applied a broad
approach to interpret claim terms by beginning with a generic definition
for the terms and not limiting that definition by the rest of the patent
documents. 67 Phillips invented modular, steel-shell panels that could be
welded together to form load-bearing, vandalism-resistant walls. 68 He
patented the invention and entered into an arrangement with AWH Corp.
to market and sell the panels. 69 After the relationship terminated,
however, Phillips received sales brochures from AWH that showed the
company was continuing to use his invention. 70 He then sued for patent
infringement in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. 71
The district court determined that AWH did not infringe Phillips’s
patent because the specification described a specific type of vandalismresistant wall containing internal steel “baffles” that did not encompass

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1583–84.
Id.
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
Id. at 1309.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

7

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 8
L-MURPHY

1220

8/3/2011 11:07:39 AM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

AWH’s design. 72 The court focused on the language of claim one to
examine how the term “baffles” was used; the claim described “steel
baffles extending inwardly from steel shell walls.” 73 The court further
established that every textual reference in the specification and its
diagrams depicted baffles at angles other than ninety degrees to the wall
faces. 74 The court used this evidence to find that in the patent, the
baffles must extend inward at an oblique or acute angle to the wall
face. 75 Because AWH walls contained baffles at angles of ninety
degrees, and thus outside of the scope of the patent claims, the district
court concluded that the company did not infringe the patent. 76
En banc, the Federal Circuit adopted a broader method of claim
construction to vacate the lower court’s judgment of non-infringement. 77
The court found claims, as a baseline, “are generally given their ordinary
and customary meaning” from the viewpoint of “a person of ordinary
skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” 78 The court
added that the disputed term is deemed to be read by such a person in
the context of the entire patent, including the specification, rather than
merely in the context of the particular claim in which the term appears. 79
72. Id.
73. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 1309–28. Phillips appealed to the Federal Circuit, which initially agreed with the
district court’s method of claim construction. Id. at 1309. On the first hearing, a majority of the divided
three-judge panel affirmed the district court’s finding of non-infringement. Id. at 1309–10. Based on
the written description, the panel held that the claim term “baffles” excluded structures that extended at
a ninety-degree angle from the walls. Id. at 1310. The court relied on the specification’s repeated
references to the ability of the claimed baffles to deflect projectiles on its description of the baffles as
being disposed at such angles that bullets would be deflected. Id. The Federal Circuit panel did not find
in the specification any disclosure of baffles extending from the walls at right angles. Id. The panel
concluded that the patent specification was “intended to support and inform the claims,” and that the
Phillips patent “ma[de] it unmistakably clear that the invention involve[d] baffle angled at other than
90” degrees. Id. The Federal Circuit panel therefore affirmed the district court’s summary judgment of
non-infringement. Id.
The dissenting judge on the panel believed that the majority improperly construed the claims
to limit them to the embodiment of the invention disclosed in the specification, rather than adopting the
plain meaning of the term “baffles.” Id. In the dissenting judge’s opinion, nothing in the specification
defined the term “baffles” or specifically limited the scope of that term to less than its ordinary meaning.
Id. He argued that the specification “‘merely identifie[d] impact resistance as one of several objectives
of the invention.’” Id. (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Dyk, J.,
dissenting in part), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). He concluded
that there was “no reason to supplement the plain meaning of the claim language with a limitation” that
was described in the specification as the preferred embodiment for deflecting bullets. Id. The dissenting
judge construed the term “baffles” in a manner resulting in a finding that AWH infringed the patent. Id.
78. Id. at 1312–13.
79. Id. at 1313.
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The Federal Circuit concluded that a judge should determine this
meaning by looking to sources available to the public, such as the claims
themselves, the remainder of the specification, and the prosecution
history, which shows what a person of skill in the art, would have
understood the disputed claims to mean. 80 The court held that while
“claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of
particular claim terms,” claims are fully integrated with and “‘must be
read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’”81 The court
further established that if the specification reveals a definition for a term
that differs from the ordinary meaning of the term, “the inventor’s
lexicography governs.” 82 Thus, the Federal Circuit provided that a
judge should construct the terms in claims by heavily relying on the
specification. 83
The Federal Circuit applied this rule to broadly construe “baffles” to
include more than the preferred embodiment of projections at acute
angles described in the specification. 84 It found that the plain and
ordinary meaning of “baffles” was the generic dictionary meaning;
“objects that check, impede, or obstruct the flow of something.” 85 The
court determined that this definition included projections at ninetydegree angles. 86 The court found that intrinsic evidence confirmed a
person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the term
“baffles” as used in the patent would have that generic meaning. 87 The
court next dealt with the other claims that specified functions served by
baffles, such as projecting at angles for deflecting projectiles. 88 It held
that “[t]he fact that the written description . . . sets forth multiple
objectives to be served by the baffles recited in the claims confirms that
the term ‘baffles’ should not be read restrictively to require that baffles
in each case serve all of the recited functions.” 89 The court reasoned
that the United States Patent and Trademark Office would not have
granted an invalid patent, so “the ambiguity in the claim language
should therefore be resolved in a manner that would preserve the

80. Id. at 1314.
81. Id. at 1314–15 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
1996); Markman I, 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)).
82. Id. at 1316.
83. Id. at 1317.
84. See id. at 1324–28.
85. Id. at 1324.
86. Id. at 1327.
87. Id. at 1324–25.
88. See id. at 1325.
89. Id. at 1326–27.
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patent’s validity.” 90 Consequently, the court construed the term
“baffles” broadly to encompass more than the embodiment described in
the specification and to include projections at all angles. 91
To return to the example of the pen, a judge applying the broad claim
construction approach would begin by determining the ordinary and
customary meaning of the claim term “cylindrical utensil” in a way that
a person with ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would
determine it. This may be the generic dictionary meaning of the term.
Suppose that the ordinary and customary meaning of the term was “an
object that easily fits into a person’s hand.” Next, the judge would read
the patent application to determine if the claims, specification, or
prosecution history clearly revealed a definition that differed from this
meaning. If the specification clearly defined a “cylindrical utensil” as “a
storage container specifically filled with ink,” this definition would be
the inventor’s lexicography and would govern the court’s decision. If,
however, the specification merely referred to preferred embodiments
that were not inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the claim terms,
the ordinary meaning would prevail. Therefore, a drawing in the
specification merely showing a storage container filled with ink could
not restrict the definition to require ink unless it was clearly stated. This
illustrates the broad method that judges may use to construe patent claim
terms.
3. A Narrow Approach to the Use of the Specification During Claim
Construction
In SciMed Life Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems,
Inc., the Federal Circuit exercised a narrow approach to interpreting
claim terms that were limited by the patent documents. 92 SciMed
owned three patents that covered balloon dilatation catheters, used in
coronary angioplasty procedures to remove coronary artery
restrictions. 93 The claimed catheters contained two passageways, called
lumens. 94 The parties agreed that only two arrangements for the lumens
existed. 95 The dual lumen configuration featured lumens positioned

90. Id. at 1327.
91. Id.
92. See generally SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
93. Id. at 1338–39.
94. Id. at 1339.
95. Id.
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side-by-side within the catheter. 96 The second configuration, the coaxial
configuration, placed one lumen inside the other and was annular in
shape when viewed in cross-section. 97
SciMed sued Advanced
Cardiovascular Systems for infringement of its patent by using a dual
lumen configuration. 98 The court had to determine whether SciMed’s
patents encompassed the dual lumen configuration. 99
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s narrow approach to
claim construction and agreed that the specification limited the scope to
coaxial lumens. 100
SciMed argued that this method of claim
construction would be reading a limitation from the written description
into the claims, a “cardinal sin[] of patent law.” 101 The Federal Circuit,
however, rejected that argument because the district court read the
claims “‘in view of the specification, of which they are a part,’” as
mandated by the Federal Circuit in Markman I. 102 The appellate court
found that “[w]here the specification makes clear that the invention does
not include a particular feature, that feature is deemed to be outside the
reach of the claims . . . .” 103 It added that that is the case “even though
the language of the claims, read without reference to the specification,
might be considered broad enough to encompass the feature in
question.” 104 The court also found that the claims were limited when
only one embodiment was described and enabled in the specification:
“‘when the “preferred embodiment” is described as the invention itself,
the claims are not entitled to a broader scope than that embodiment.’” 105
The court applied these findings to the catheter described in SciMed’s
patents to establish that the specification limited the claims to a coaxial
configuration. 106 First, the court read the abstract of the specification to
refer to an inner tube and an annular position, which identified a coaxial

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1338–40.
99. Id. at 1340.
100. See id. at 1345. The district court applied a narrow approach to claim construction by
reading the specification to hold that the patents did not cover the dual lumen configuration. See id. at
1339. The district court found that the language contained in the specification expressly limited all
embodiments of the claimed invention to a coaxial structure. Id. SciMed conceded that under the
district court’s claim construction, Advanced Cardiovascular did not infringe its patents, and SciMed
appealed to the Federal Circuit. Id. at 1345.
101. Id. at 1340.
102. Id. (quoting Markman I, 52 F.3d 967, 979–80 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)).
103. Id. at 1341.
104. Id.
105. Id. (quoting Wang Labs, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
106. See id. at 1342–45.
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configuration. 107 Second, the court found that the portions of the written
descriptions of each of SciMed’s patents discussing disadvantages of
prior art structures explained that dual lumen configuration catheters
have shaft sizes larger than necessary and are stiffer than desired. 108
Third, the court examined the summary of invention, which described an
inner core tube with a guide wire lumen extending through it and an
outer sleeve extending annular inflation lumen, characterizing a coaxial
configuration. 109 The Federal Circuit construed the specification in a
way that the claims excluded the dual lumen arrangement. 110
In the example of the pen, the narrow claim term construction method
also begins with determining the ordinary meaning of the claim terms.
However, this is accomplished by reading the other claims,
specification, and prosecution history.
Suppose that the patent
documents repeatedly stated that pen was a storage container filled with
ink, but illustrated the pen as an object that easily fits into a person’s
hand in the drawings. Then, under the narrow method of claim
construction, the term would be construed with the limited definition of
a storage container filled with ink that easily fits into a person’s hand as
the ordinary meaning. This meaning could not then be broadened to
include other embodiments, even though the other embodiments could
fall within the meaning of the text of the documents. For example, a
jumbo pen would not then be covered by the narrow meaning of the
term pen, because although it is a storage container filled with ink, it
would not easily fit into a person’s hand. This illustrates the narrow
method of claim construction.
4. Reconciling the Different Approaches
In Nystrom v. TREX Co., Inc., the Federal Circuit attempted to
reconcile the broad and narrow approach of claim construction in light
of Phillips. Nystrom invented boards for use in constructing floors for
decks. 111 Nystrom sued TREX, which manufactured deck floor planks
made out of composites of recycled plastic and wood fibers, for
infringement of his patent. 112 The court had to decide whether the term

107. Id. at 1342.
108. Id. at 1342–43.
109. Id. at 1343.
110. Id. at 1343, 1345.
111. Nystrom v. Trex Co., Inc., 374 F.3d 1105, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Nystrom I), withdrawn,
opinion replaced by Nystrom II, 424 F.3d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
112. Id. at 1109.
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“board” in Nystrom’s claims included non-wood materials. 113
Initially, the Federal Circuit began the claim construction with a
broad meaning by reviewing the claims themselves, dictionaries,
treatises, the specification, and prosecution history to determine the
claim term’s ordinary meaning. 114 The court noted that the ordinary and
customary meaning could “be overcome if the patentee has acted as his
or her own lexicographer in explicitly setting forth a definition” or has
clearly disclaimed the scope of coverage. 115 After reviewing these
references, the court found the word “board” to encompass both a piece
of wood and a similarly shaped piece of a rigid material. 116 The court
found this because “Nystrom did not disclaim boards made from
materials other than logs.” 117 It read the specification to describe logs as
a preferred embodiment, which recognized that decking boards may be
made from other rigid materials. 118 After construing the meaning of
“board,” the court found that the term should be given the full range of
its ordinary meaning, consistent with the written description, to include
TREX’s wood composite decking material. 119
The Federal Circuit then reconsidered Nystrom in light of Phillips and
narrowed its claim term construction. 120 The court repeated that the
claims did “not include any language describing the ‘board’ as cut from
a log or necessarily being made of wood.” 121 The court, however, then
examined the specification to determine that “‘board’ must be limited to
wood cut from a log.” 122 The written description, stating that “[a]
variety of specialized flooring materials have been developed for interior
and exterior use,” discussed “wood flooring materials for exterior
use.” 123 The written description maintained that context, the court
113. Id. at 1110–11. The district court applied a limited definition of the claim term and construed
the word “board” to mean “‘a piece of elongated construction material made from wood cut from a
log.’” Id. at 1121. It concluded that Nystrom limited the scope of the claim term with statements in the
specification that a board was cut or obtained from a log and with statements made by Nystrom during
prosecution in arguing against a rejection. Id. Consequently, the district court held the claims limited to
boards made of wood and found for non-infringement. Id. Nystrom appealed the decision because the
claim language did not contain a description of the material. Id. at 1110–11. Also, he contended that it
was an error to rely on statements in the specification to limit the claims because those statements did
not constitute a clear disavowal of claim scope. Id. at 1111.
114. Id. at 1111–13.
115. Id. at 1111.
116. Id. at 1111–12.
117. Id. at 1112.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 1113.
120. Nystrom II, 424 F.3d 1136, 1138, 1145–46 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
121. Id. at 1143.
122. Id.
123. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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found. 124 The court also reviewed the prosecution history, which
“provide[d] additional context . . . consistent with the written
description.” 125 The court found that Nystrom’s statements during
prosecution described the invention as cut from a log. 126 The court
explained that under Phillips, Nystrom was “not entitled to a claim
construction divorced from the context of the written description and
prosecution history.” 127 Because the written description and prosecution
history consistently used the term “board” to refer to wood, the court
interpreted the term in the claim to use that definition and limit the claim
term. 128
The Federal Circuit then explained that this narrow claim construction
was consistent with its decision in Phillips, which applied a broad claim
construction approach. 129 It reconciled the cases by explaining that in
Phillips, the ordinary meaning of “baffles” included all angles, and the
language in the patent application did not limit the ordinary meaning.130
In Nystrom, however, the ordinary meaning of “board” was a sawed
piece of lumber, and Nystrom sought to broaden that definition in his
arguments. 131 The court found that broadening the definition absent
language in the intrinsic record evidencing an intent to broaden a term’s
definition beyond its ordinary meaning violated claim construction
principles announced in Phillips. 132
III. MARTEK BIOSCIENCES CORP. V. NUTRINOVA, INC.
In Martek, the Federal Circuit closely followed the broad claim
construction approach expressed in Phillips to interpret the term
“animal” in Martek’s claims to be governed by a single definition in the
specification. 133 The court was asked to construe the term “animal” to
determine whether Lonza infringed Martek’s patent by implementing the
described invention to increase DHAs on humans. 134 Martek’s patent
contained one sentence that defined the term “animal” as any organism

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id. at 1143.
Id. at 1144.
Id. at 1144–45.
Id. at 1145.
See id. at 1145–46.
Id. at 1145.
Id.
Id. at 1145–46.
See Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1368, 1379.
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belonging to the animal kingdom. 135 However, the rest of patent
application, including the claims and written description, described
animals that produced food. 136 The court relied on Phillips to hold that
“[w]hen a patentee explicitly defines a claim term in the patent
specification, the patentee’s definition controls.” 137
The court
determined that the patent specification clearly defined the term
“animals” as any organism belonging to the animal kingdom. 138 It also
found that humans are a part of that kingdom and were therefore covered
by the claims. 139 Thus, the Federal Circuit followed Phillips to allow
Martek to define “animal” broadly. 140
The Federal Circuit held that the references to food-producing nonhuman animals merely described preferred embodiments that should not
be read to limit the scope of the claims. 141 The court concluded that the
disclosure of preferred non-human animals did not constitute a clear
exclusion of humans. 142 It found that the repeated references to animals
that produced milk products, eggs, meat, and seafood did not disavow
humans because those animals were preferred embodiments and found
further that animals were not required to produce a food product. 143
Also, the court stated that the patent application did not exclude humans
because no words or phrases manifestly disclaimed patent coverage. 144
It concluded that the generic words used to describe “animals” could be
applied to humans. 145 Therefore, the Federal Circuit did not limit the
scope of the claims based on the descriptions given in the
specification. 146
Two judges on the five-judge Federal Circuit panel dissented from the
majority opinion in favor of a narrow claim construction approach
because the definition of “animal” conflicted with the rest of the
specification. 147 The dissenters agreed that patentees could be their own
lexicographers and that the specification recited a definition of animals

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 1380.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1381.
Id.
Id. at 1380–82.
Id.
Id. at 1381–82.
Id. at 1381.
Id.
Id. at 1382.
Id. at 1382–85 (Lourie, J., dissenting in part).
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that included humans. 148 The judges, however, viewed Martek’s singlesentence definition of the term “animal” to be totally negated by the
other text. 149 Judge Lourie, in dissent, suggested that a claim term must
be read “in a manner that comports with the . . . patent as a whole.”150
Rather than reading the single-line definition in isolation, the dissenters
stated, one should read the entire patent to properly construe the
meaning. 151 The dissenters found that the term “animal” would have
excluded humans from the scope of Martek’s patent. 152
The dissenting judges then considered the entire specification to
construe “animal,” employing a narrow claim construction method. 153
The judges began their analysis with the language in claim one, the
broadest claim, which claimed “a method of raising an animal” to
increase the concentration of omega-3 HUFA in the animal. 154 They
also relied on the rest of the specification, which was directed to raising
non-human animals, not to rearing children. 155 Further, they found the
wording of the invention that described raising animals and food
products to be limiting language. 156 Also, the dissenters relied on the
summary of the invention in the patent, which stated that animals raised
by the invented process included poultry, cattle, swine, and seafood.157
The sentences directly following the definition of “animal” in the
specification listed non-human animals from which food products are
derived. 158 The dissenters reasoned that the ways “animal” was used in
the remainder of the specification were not preferred embodiments, but
strongly supported a conclusion that the invention excluded humans. 159
The dissenting judges, relying on the entire specification, determined
that the invention not only excluded humans, but distinguished animals
from humans. 160 They noted that the specification discussed a method
to incorporate the invention into animal feed. 161 The dissenters
concluded that the specification differentiated humans and animals when

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 1382–83.
Id. at 1383–85.
Id. at 1383.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1383–84.
Id. at 1384.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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it referred to how the invention could “‘enhance . . . the nutritional value
of processed foods for human intake or for animal feed.’” 162 They
believed that there would have been no need to specify treatment for
humans if humans were included in the meaning of “animals.” 163 The
dissenters reasoned that “the fact that the milk or meat products of the
animals subjected to the method of the patent can be fed to humans does
not mean that humans are among the animals that are raised . . . .”164
They criticized the majority for “fail[ing] to make a distinction between
using omega-3 HUFAs as a nutritional supplement for humans and
animals, . . . clearly contemplated in the patent, and raising humans to be
the source of such a nutritional supplement . . . .” 165 Therefore, the
dissenting judges would have limited the term “animal” in the claims to
non-humans. 166
IV. DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court placed the authority for construing claims with
the judges of the Federal Circuit by holding that it is a solely legal
issue. 167 The Federal Circuit has provided two conflicting methods for
interpreting claim terms, a broad approach and a narrow approach,
which have not been reconciled. 168 The judges in Martek followed
Phillips to arrive at a broad definition of the term “animals.” 169
However, this broad approach could enlarge problems within the patent
system. An improved solution would be to apply a narrower method of
construing claims.
A. The Methods of Claim Construction Used by the Federal Circuit Are
Inconsistent
In Phillips, the broad claim construction approach applied by the
Federal Circuit was inconsistent with its own reasoning. The court held
that the judge should use the plain and ordinary meaning of a term found
in the intrinsic record of the claims, specification, and prosecution from
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1384–85.
167. Markman II, 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996).
168. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (applying a broad
approach for claim construction); SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242
F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (applying a narrow approach for claim construction).
169. Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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the viewpoint of a person with ordinary skill in the art. It further held
that dictionaries may be used beyond that if necessary. 170 However, it
then began its analysis with a broad dictionary meaning as the baseline
for the claim term meaning. 171 It then read the claims, specification, and
prosecution history to determine whether the inventor used meanings
that differed from the dictionary meaning. 172 If there were differences,
the court found them to be preferred embodiments that could not be read
to limit the claims. 173 It therefore was inconsistent with its own
reasoning to begin with an extrinsic dictionary meaning that was not
altered by any differences within the intrinsic evidence.
In addition, the broad and narrow approaches prescribed by the
Federal Circuit are inconsistent with each other. In SciMed, the Federal
Circuit used a narrow approach to define the claim terms that used the
specification as part of the baseline definition of the claim term instead
of a generic ordinary meaning in the broad approach. 174 In this
approach, the court also began with the plain and ordinary meaning of
the term. 175 However, the narrow approach used a different starting
place because it established the baseline meaning relying on the
specification, other claims, and prosecution history. 176 From this
reading, the court found a limited plain and ordinary meaning of the
claim terms was limited to an annular, coaxial lumen configuration. 177
The descriptions in the patent application were not preferred
embodiments, but went directly to defining the claim terms. SciMed
demonstrated a more narrow approach to determining the meaning of
claim terms that applied the written description in the patent documents
to the ordinary meaning of the claim term in question. The different
baseline meanings and view of preferred embodiments demonstrate the
inconsistencies of the broad and narrow approaches to claim
construction that the Federal Circuit applied.
In Nystrom, the Federal Circuit then interpreted its broad method of
claim construction from Phillips as a narrow claim construction method.
Prior to Phillips, the court in Nystrom, began with a broad dictionary
definition. 178 It then found the other descriptions in the patent to be
170. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1319.
171. Id. at 1324–25.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1326–27.
174. See SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1342 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Nystrom I, 374 F.3d 1105, 1112 (Fed. Cir. 2004), withdrawn, opinion replaced by Nystrom
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preferred embodiments that did not disclaim non-wood materials. 179
After Phillips, the Nystrom court revised its decision to apply the law
from Phillips. In this application, the court began with a plain and
ordinary definition of “board” read from the specification, other claims,
and prosecution history. 180 It found the definition to be a limited one
that excluded non-wood materials from the embodiments described. 181
It followed the reasoning in Phillips, which actually specifies a narrow
claim construction approach. When applying the law from Phillips, the
Federal Circuit took the narrow approach similar to that taken in SciMed
instead of the approach actually used in Phillips.
In summary, the Federal Circuit unsuccessfully reconciled these
inconsistent claim construction approaches.
The different claim
construction methods began with a different baseline meaning. Both
cases began with the ordinary meaning of the term, but Phillips used a
broad dictionary meaning as the ordinary definition, while Nystrom
began with a limited meaning read from the patent specification as the
ordinary definition. 182 The court then read the descriptions of the
invention in Phillips as preferred embodiments that could not be used to
narrow the claims. 183 In Nystrom, however, the descriptions were
already a part of the claim meaning and were not considered to be
preferred embodiments. 184 Thus, Nystrom was unable to go broader
than that meaning to encompass a dictionary definition of other nonwood materials as Phillips did for baffles. The Federal Circuit attempted
to reconcile these approaches by stating that the rules articulated in
Phillips would not allow Nystrom to broaden the ordinary meaning of
the claim term. 185 However, the court failed to consider the different
starting points for the two methods in its attempt to reconcile the cases.
Because of the differences in determining the baseline of the claim
meaning, the use of a broad approach in Phillips and a narrow approach
in Nystrom cannot be reconciled.

II, 424 F.3d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
179. Id. at 1112–13.
180. Nystrom II, 424 F.3d at 1144.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1143–44.
183. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
184. Nystrom II, 424 F.3d at 1145.
185. Id.
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B. The Federal Circuit Applied the Broad Phillips Approach in Martek
The Federal Circuit in Martek began with a broad, ordinary meaning
of the claim term, similar to Phillips. It noted that patentees may be
their own lexicographers and began with the definition of “animal”
given by the patentee: any member of the animal kingdom. 186 This
could be viewed as different from Phillips because that case began with
a dictionary meaning, while Martek began with a meaning given in the
specification. However, Martek’s meaning was a broad definition that
was not taken from reading the entire specification, but merely one
sentence. Because the term “animal” was given such a broad meaning,
it included humans as part of the animal kingdom. 187 This broad
meaning given as the plain and ordinary definition of the term animals is
similar to the method provided in Phillips.
Because the court began with a broad, ordinary meaning for the claim
term, the other descriptions were viewed, as in Phillips, as preferred
embodiments that could not limit the claims.
Martek’s entire
specification repeatedly described animals that produced a food
product. 188 Because these descriptions were not used to determine the
ordinary meaning of the term, the court followed Phillips to view them
as preferred embodiments. Because the limitations to economic animals
were viewed as preferred embodiments, it was not read to restrict the
scope of the claims. Therefore, the Federal Circuit followed the broad
approach applied in Phillips to interpret the meaning of claim terms.
C. Problems Associated with the Broad Application of Claim
Construction in Martek
The broad application of claim construction followed by the Federal
Circuit in Martek enlarges problems within the patent system. For
instance, inventors may be granted a monopoly on more than what they
intended or on more than was disclosed to the public. Because an
inventor may be granted coverage on more than was disclosed, the
public is not put on notice of what it is able to make, use, or sell, which
leads to uncertainty in the patent system. The inconsistencies in the
Federal Circuit’s decisions also diminish uniformity in the patent
system.

186. Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1381–82.
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1. Martek Failed to Consider the Inventor’s Intent
By interpreting “animals” to include humans, the Federal Circuit did
not consider what Martek intended to be its invention at the time the
patent application was filed. As the dissenting judges stated, reading the
specification as a whole leads to the conclusion that the DHA
supplements were meant only for non-human animals. 189 The dissenters
argued that the intent of the patentee was only to include humans and
animals in the food product of the supplemented animals, not to include
humans to make food products for humans. 190 The consistent references
to economic and food-producing animals demonstrated intent only to
include non-humans in the meaning of animals. By giving the patentee
a broader definition, the court gave the patentee more than what he
intended his invention to be. If the patentee intended to include humans
as part of the supplemented animals, more thought should have been
given to develop an invention for humans rather than merely lumping
them in with non-human animals.
As in contract law, the judge in a patent case interprets the drafter’s
intent in creating and signing the document. 191 A court looks
objectively to the intent and demonstration of the parties to find if there
was a valid “contract” with mutual assent. 192 The Restatement (First) of
Contracts provides that “[a] manifestation of mutual assent by the parties
to an informal contract is essential to its formation and the acts by which
such assent is manifested, must be done with the intent to do those
acts.” 193 Similarly, the judge should interpret the intent of the patentee
in drafting his patent.
The failure to consider the inventor’s intent in Martek also broadened
the scope of the monopoly to violate 35 U.S.C. § 112. Congress granted
patent monopolies in exchange for public disclosure to promote
sciences. 194 This monopoly was not to be freely given, and 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 requires a clear disclosure to enable a person skilled in the art to
make and use the invention. 195 The descriptions in the specification in
Martek only described non-human “animals.” It therefore did not
clearly disclose how to perform the invention with human “animals.”
Not clearly pointing out the scope of the invention and failing to enable

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. at 1382–85 (Lourie, J., dissenting in part).
Id.
See Ray v. William G. Eurice & Bros., Inc., 93 A.2d 272, 278 (Md. 1952).
Id.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 20 (1932)).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1966); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
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a person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention
violates 35 U.S.C. § 112. Thus, by adopting a broad meaning of
“animals,” the Federal Circuit unreasonably enhanced the scope of
Martek’s patent monopoly.
2. The Broad Claim Construction Approach in Martek Causes
Uncertainty in the Patent System
Additionally, a broad claim construction approach increases
uncertainty in the patent system because it prevents the public from
clearly knowing what the patent covers. Intellectual property can be
compared to real property, where deeds expressly mark the boundaries
of what land a person owns. However, if the court chooses a broad
definition not clearly defined in the specification, the boundaries of the
invention will not be clearly marked. The public will not be put on
notice regarding what it can make, use, or sell. Dictionary meanings
may change or vary between editions, which leads to uncertainty. This
is why the Federal Circuit concluded that extrinsic evidence is not as
reliable as intrinsic evidence. 196 It is difficult to determine the endless
embodiments of an invention not taught in the patent. The court may
include more than was considered in the patent application in the claim
term meaning, which does not let the public know what is included.
Martek provides an example of the uncertainty in the patent system
caused by an unclear broad claim meaning. Martek provided a
definition in the specification for the term “animal.” However, it was
only a single sentence and was inconsistent with the rest of the
specification. By allowing Martek to have the broad meaning from a
single sentence, it is uncertain what its invention covered. It was
unexpected and unclear that the multiple references to food-producing
non-human animals would cover an application to humans. The court
should have considered the specification as a whole to find the ordinary
meaning of the claim term. The specification was available to the public
and would have put the public on proper notice of what was included in
the invention to lead to more certainty in the patent system.
3. The Broad Application in Martek also Diminishes Uniformity in the
Patent System
The two inconsistent methods of claim construction developed by the
Federal Circuit diminish uniformity within the patent system. As

196. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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previously discussed, the two approaches to claim construction are
inconsistent because each uses a different method to determine the
baseline meaning of the claim terms. Also, including external sources
used in determining the baseline definition of a claim term provides less
reliability regarding where the court will obtain this baseline. The
Supreme Court deemed uniformity to be an important element in patent
law. 197 The Federal Circuit was specifically created to provide more
uniformity in the patent system because it is a national process. 198 The
Supreme Court also found claim construction to be a purely legal as a
means of providing uniformity and stability in the patent system. 199 The
Federal Circuit is failing to provide this much-needed uniformity by
inconsistently applying the different approaches.
D. A Narrow Approach for Claim Construction Would Solve Problems
in the Patent System
The narrow approach of claim construction would include the
patentee’s intent of what the invention covered. As stated in 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, the patent must put forth claims that define the boundaries of the
invention, and the specification must describe the claims. 200 Therefore,
the patent application itself contains the inventor’s intent of what the
scope of the invention is. The narrow approach closely follows this
intent by establishing the baseline of the claim terms from the claim
language and specification that the inventor set forth. This is also
similar to contract law, which interprets the contract to consider the
parties’ intent to be bound. 201 This approach differs from beginning
with a generic ordinary meaning to find objectively what the claim terms
mean, which was too departed from the intent of the inventor. Thus, the
court should use the baseline of the claim meaning by using the
specification and claims to gain the inventor’s intent required by 35
U.S.C. § 112, instead of a broad ordinary meaning departed from this
intent.
The narrow claim construction approach would also improve the
uncertainty contained within the patent system. The broad approach is
uncertain because of the baseline for determining the claim meaning.
When the baseline meaning of the claim term is external and easily
197. Markman II, 517 U.S. 370, 390–91 (1996).
198. Int’l Law Office, Ropes & Gray, Supreme Court Limits Federal Circuit Jurisdiction over
Patent Appeals, Oct. 2002, http://www.ropesgray.com/newspubs/detail.aspx?publication=583.
199. Markman II, 517 U.S. at 390–91.
200. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
201. Ray v. William G. Eurice & Bros., Inc., 93 A.2d 272, 278 (Md. 1952).
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changed, depending on which dictionary is used, the broad approach is
difficult to predict. However, the narrow approach is contained within
the patent documents. As stated in Phillips, this is desirable because it is
isolated from change and more reliable. 202 It provides a certain baseline
meaning for the claim terms. Because a person would only need to
inspect the isolated and unchanging patent documents, this narrow claim
construction approach would eliminate some of the uncertainties within
the patent system.
A narrow approach to claim construction would also improve
uniformity within the patent system. The patent system is a national
system, but the split in the Federal Circuit case law does not provide this
intended uniformity. Choosing one claim construction approach would
increase uniformity. The narrow claim construction approach would be
advantageous because it also considers the inventor’s intent and
provides more certainty. Thus, the Federal Circuit should settle on the
narrow claim construction approach to optimally improve the patent
system.
If the Federal Circuit had applied the narrow claim construction
approach in Martek, the appropriate result would have been reached to
not include humans in the term “animals.” Reading the entire patent
document as a whole suggests that Martek did not consider humans to be
covered by the invention. The narrow approach would have included
the inventor’s understanding into the baseline meaning of animals and
followed his intent not to include humans. By only relying on the patent
documents to construe claim meaning, the probable court interpretation
of the definition becomes more certain. The repeated references to foodproducing animals in Martek’s specification and claims would have
prevailed to cover only what was certainly taught by the invention.
Following this method consistently would increase uniformity in the
patent system.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Federal Circuit should follow the narrow approach
for construing patent claim terms. The Federal Circuit has provided two
approaches for construing claim terms, a broad and narrow approach.
The broad approach was used to construe the term “animal” in Martek.
This lead, however, to a decision that did not consider the inventor’s
intent of the coverage of the invention, added uncertainty into ordinary
meanings of claim terms, and decreased uniformity within the national

202. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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patent system. The Federal Circuit could have avoided these problems
by applying the narrow claim construction approach.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

25

